schools characteristic of the early stages of a science's development. No natural history can 98 be interpreted in the absence of at least some implicit body of intertwined theoretical and 99 methodological belief that permits selection, evaluation, and criticism. If that body of belief 100 is not already implicit in the collection of facts -in which case more than 'mere fact' are at 101 hand -it must be externally supplied, perhaps by a current metaphysic, by another science,
On the scientic quality of individual dierences research

"
[O]ne source of a malign compass deviation in the early days has been the very eagerness to assume a true scientic status. For this led to premature regimentation, and indeed slavishness, in following the rules of the older, established sciences when the need was really for invention of methods and trial-and-error exploration of the scientic quality of a new area.
Raymond B. Cattell (1966) 
The "scientic issue" has been a perennial debate (Jastrow, 1901; Boring, 1923; Anastasi, 1948; 142 Hornstein, 1988 142 Hornstein, , 1992 among those who study individual dierences, and it has occasionally been quite Association when James McKeen Cattell interrupted the meeting to castigate a fellow member for 145 mentioning Freud's name in the context of scientic discourse (Dallenbach, 1955) (this was far more 146 controversial than it might seem today as psychoanalytic theories of personality organization were 147 increasingly popular among APA members at that time). The essence of the controversy is that some 148 approaches to psychological research claim to be more representative of science than others (by virtue 149 of quantication and generalizability) in contrast to the Kantian view that the quantication of mental 150 events is philosophically impossible (Kant, 1979; Loevinger, 1987) . The suggestion that quantication 151 and generalizability are key components of the scientic method (Popper, 1959) causes them to be 152 viewed, by turns, as either a necessity in the study of individual dierences (Cattell, 1940) or a mindless 153 and unwarranted conformity (Giorgi, 1975) to the standards of the so-called natural sciences.
154
The defense against quantication and the search for generalizability rests largely on the belief that idiographic study is scientically problematic because it subordinates the search for a generalizable 164 structure of dierences across individuals. When used in isolation, idiographic approaches seldom oer 165 opportunities for theory testing in the Popperian sense (Popper, 1959) , mainly because it is not 166 currently possible to identify, measure, and control every one of the environmental and biological 167 variables underlying individual outcomes.
168
The esoteric nature of this debate is undeniable; it hinges upon the degree of commonality in 169 dierences. Yet Eysenck (1985) implies that inaction (or perhaps even boredom) caused by this esoteric 170 bind is actually the primary obstacle to graduation from the pre-paradigmatic state. The study of 171 individual dierences, according to his logic, is dissimilar from paradigmatic sciences in that there there 172 is a surplus of "theories" which are either (a) unlikely to ever enter into the realm of science on the 173 grounds that they are incapable of being used to make testable predictions; or (b) so narrow and 174 methodologically restrictive that they make veriable predictions of little-to-no relevance. The latter 175 approach sacrices utility for the sake of rigorous scientic methods (though it should be noted that Eysenck's opposition to strict empiricism was somewhat inconsistent over the last 10 years of his 177 career). If a paradigm in individual dierences research were to gain acceptance according to Kuhn's 178 suggestion -by merely outdoing its competitors -it would have to fulll the basic qualications of 179 science while remaining broad enough to address issues of demonstrable relevance.
180
Eysenck is not unique in calling for a middle path. To the contrary, it seems that individual dierence 181 scholars ironically relish the typological as an explicative tool. Allport pitted the Realist against the 182 Nominalist (Allport and Odbert, 1936) and Actuarial approaches (Allport, 1940); Meehl (1954) the 183 Statistical versus the Clinical. Raymond Cattell split the eld into three camps: those who embraced the 184 multivariate approach, the overly-rigorous "bivariate brass instrument" methodologists, and a loose 185 collection of "numerous quasi-scientic schools which led to that scholastic Tower of Babel" (Cattell, 186 1966, p. 8) . (All of these scholars were admittedly biased towards the dierential approach advocated 187 herein.) Cronbach (1957; was perhaps more objective in his description of the "Tight Little Island" 188 of experimentalists and the united principalities of the correlationalists' "Holy Roman Empire. "
189
The generalized form of these observations is that individual dierences research can be organized 190 along a spectrum according to its "scientic-ness. " This spectrum is mainly methodological though does 191 also reect underlying theory in that the most scientic methods tend to address mechanisms of 192 behavior that are common to the human species while the least scientic approaches tend to deal with 193 idiographic aspects of individual experience. As Kluckhohn and Murray (1948) 
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Meehl:
Cronbach:
Cattell:
"Actuarial" Figure 1 .1: The scientic dimension in research on psychological individual dierences Note: This is not intended to exhaustively depict all the major domains of individual dierences research nor does it attempt to account for elds of psychological research that seek to describe interpersonal interaction. problematic types described by Eysenck (those which make untestable predictions on the left and those 198 which fail to make predictions of relevance on the right). The labels prescribed by others (Allport, that their exact placement would likely lead to some debate among the scholars working in these areas.
201
The rationale for explicit description of this dimension, despite its imprecision, is to demonstrate the Although it is true that it is the goal of science to discover rules which permit the association and foretelling of facts, this is not its only aim. It also seeks to reduce the connections discovered to the smallest possible number of mutually independent conceptual elements.
Albert Einstein (1941) "
In practice, the "dierential psychology" label is used only rarely and even then it is viewed as 211 essentially synonymous with "personality. " The tendency for these terms to be used interchangeably is (e.g., neuroanatomical dierences) and vice-versa (e.g., case studies of phenomenological experience).
216
A more nuanced, and perhaps impactful, issue with imbrication of these terms relates to imprecision of 217 the term "personality" more generally. After decades of disagreement about the subtle dierences between terms such as character, temperament, and personality (Allport, 1921; Fernald, 1920; Gilliland, 219 1928; Jastrow, 1915; Klages, 1929; May and Hartshorne, 1927; McDougall, 1929 McDougall, , 1932 Tolman, 1932; 220 Roback, 1927) , the burgeoning eld united behind Allport's (1930) view that this area of research should 221 be dened by broad use of the term "personality" to overlay all possible integrative and omnibus 222 interpretations.
223
This practical approach is far preferable to the previous ambiguity. However, there is also utility in the 224 application of more specic terminology. "Temperament" for example is generally regarded as the 225 aective component of personality (Allport and Vernon, 1930; Hofstee, 1991; Shiner and DeYoung, 2013) 226 in humans (and other species (Gosling and John, 1999; Gosling, 2001; Weinstein et al., 2008) , though this 227 necessitates further expansion of personality to include non-person animals). Similarly, "traits" are 228 subsumed under the personality label, though they are more specic than temperament. That is, some 229 personality traits might be described as temperamental traits while others would not.
230
How should "dierential psychology" be distinguished from "personality psychology"? Dierential 231 psychology seeks to describe and understand individual dierences in order to make predictions about 232 behavior. Personality psychologists who disavow the dierential psychology approach seek to merely 233 describe patterns of individuality (Lamiell, 1981 (Lamiell, , 2003 , without specication of the extent to which 234 various features of a given signature may be idiosyncratic. As mentioned earlier, these are overlapping 235 but they are not the same. The inherently scientic pursuit of (generalizable) predictiveness implies an 236 intention to identify and organize individual dierences in terms of their relationships with various 237 outcomes.
238
To be clear, use of the label "personality psychology" is not inherently awed, but rather overly vague.
239
This may be the source of its appeal. 
245
Perhaps the most important trend is the steady increase in usage of the phrase "personality psychology" 246 between 1940 and 1980. Over the same period, usage of "dierential psychology" and "trait psychology" 247 was essentially unchanged. After 1980, "personality psychology" continues to increase in frequency 248 while "dierential psychology" and "trait psychology" usage decreases. One interpretation of these 249 trends would be that some of the dierential psychology research conducted since 1980 has been more 250 generically labeled as personality research, though it's also possible that the volume and/or signicance 251 of dierential psychology research has decreased.
252
The possibility that a substantial portion of personality research might be more narrowly labeled as 253 dierential psychology is supported by two related phenomenon over the last few decades. Hofstee (Condit, 1999; Condit et al., 2001) , that strict genetic determinism lacks scientic support. Consider, for 262 example, the dierences in height among genetically homogenous populations in North and South
263
Korea (Schwekendiek, 2009; Johnson, 2010b) ; even for the small number of individual dierences where 264 variability is highly inuenced by genetics, environmental inuences can still contribute substantially.
265
Individual dierences in behavior are no exception: they are non-deterministic, multi-factorial
266
by-products of a tremendous number of environmental and genetic variables (Weiss and Lambert, 2011) .
267
The epistemic argument calls into question the value of making predictions (as previously addressed) in 268 a world of limitless individuality and situational specicity (Lamiell, 1981) . With regards to 269 nomenclature, it may be that "personality psychology" is preferred over "dierential psychology" if the 270 former suggests a greater allowance for contextualism by virtue of simply being more vague. In other 271 words, it may be the case that descriptive personality psychology research is held to looser standards 272 than predictive dierential psychology research when it comes to accounting for situational factors.
273
As trivial as these arguments may seem to many scholars, they continue to perpetuate the very 274 constraints lamented by Cattell (1966) , Cronbach (1957), and Eysenck (1985) . These arguments may 275 serve as legitimate rationale for use of the more generic "personality" label when naming program areas 276 within academic psychology departments or when describing the broad aims and objectives of a 277 research journal, but they should be eschewed by those conducting quantiable and generalizable 278 research when more specic terminology is an option 1 . While there exist at least two academic societies 279 1 Further digression might be made to consider the ways in which the terms "trait psychology" and "evolutionary psychology" relate to personality and dierential psychology. In brief, "trait psychology" or "trait theory" is very similar to dierential psychology in that traits are typically conceptualized as synonymous with individual dierences. Use of the term has been (ISSID, 2014; SMEP, 2014) and a sizable contingency of scholars, especially outside the United States, 280 who routinely frame their work as dierential psychology research when appropriate (Bouchard et al., 281 1990; Buss, 1991; Chamorro-Premuzic et al., 2011; DeYoung, 2010a; Johnson, 2007; Kanai and Rees, 2011; 282 Krueger and Johnson, 2008; Nettle, 2006; Plomin and Rende, 1991) , the number of researchers who 283 identify as dierential psychologists could be much larger still if priority were given to the use of more 284 specic nomenclature.
285
Dierential psychology is the domain of research which occupies the middle road between the strictly 286 unique and universal qualities of a species. By virtue of its focus on the psychological dierences, the 287 majority of research in this eld focuses on behavioral variance in the human species. The primary 288 challenges to the development and testing of scientic models in dierential psychology relate to the 289 identication and quantitative measurement of variables that represent a balance between 290 generalizability and variance across populations. To borrow the language of Einstein (1941) , the aim of dierential psychology is the "discovery" of those dierences "which permit the association and 292 foretelling of facts" and "reduce the connections discovered to the smallest possible number of mutually 293 independent conceptual elements. " This aim will be achieved through the comparative testing of models.
294
After lengthy digression, it is now proposed that individual dierences research is a scientic endeavor 295 in Eysenckian terms to the extent that the concepts under study are quantiable and that explanatory 296 models of these concepts are generalizable and testable. A great deal of research which meets these 297 conditions has been (and is being) conducted under the heading of "personality psychology, " though it is 298 proposed here that it would be usefully distinguished from research which does not meet these 299 conditions by the more specic label "dierential psychology. " Some might take exception to this 300 proposal but it is endorsed here in order to address the question posed earlier regarding the existence of 301 a scientic paradigm in the study of individual dierences; it is a non sequitur to evaluate this question 302 for a domain in which the practitioners fail to agree about the qualities of "scientic" output. The 303 question now considered is whether a paradigm exists in dierential psychology. confused somewhat by recent study of universal human traits (Buss, 1984; Kappeler et al., 2010; McCrae and Costa, 1997; Pinker, 2002) , which are those common among humans but unique to varying degrees relative to other species. Dierential psychology is slightly preferred because it emphasizes the key feature of dierence (within species). Evolutionary psychology is a logical subset of dierential psychology on the grounds that variation is a prerequisite for evolution but not all dierences (including, possibly, some which are predictive of behavior) can be demonstrated to have an evolutionary eect. There is also some controversy about the relevance of evolutionary pressures for modern humans given the so-called adaptive-lag hypothesis (Courtiol et al., 2012; Laland and Brown, 2006; Smith et al., 2001 ). In any case, both of these terms overlap considerably with dierential psychology; it seems that dierential psychology is more specic than trait psychology and more broad than evolutionary psychology.
parsimony. Expressed through a range of aects, cognitions and desires, these dierences are 309 themselves the manifestations of various genetic and environmental inuences which shape individuals 310 over time. This genetic and environmental interplay suggests a dynamic relationship in which the 311 "biological" dierences shape and, to some extent, are shaped by the features of our environment, 312 including our interpersonal relations. The universe of individuals dierences extends therefore to 313 include the ways in which individuals dier from one another physiologically and circumstantially as 314 well as the ways in which they dierentially relate to their environments, including other individuals.
315
Developing a model to account for all of these nuances would be a formidable task.
316
A pragmatic beginning would be to integrate the distinct disciplines of individual dierences research 317 which have evolved since the late 1800s. At the highest level of abstraction, these disciplines map 318 loosely onto the aective, cognitive and conative modes of behavioral expression. The classication of 319 psychology according to these three categories has a long history, originating perhaps with the ancient 320 Greeks (Brett, 1921 ) but more likely with Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment (Hilgard, 1980; Kant, 321 1790). This classication scheme was referenced commonly by psychologists in the late 19th and early 322 20th centuries (Hilgard, 1980; McDougall, 1923) Eysenck (1985) and Loevinger (1987) , "dominant" paradigms have emerged over the last few decades in 326 each of these disciplines: the aective domain has produced the Big Five/Five-Factor Model (Costa and 327 McCrae, 1992; Digman, 1990; Goldberg, 1990) ; the conative domain has developed the RIASEC model of 328 interests (Holland, 1959 (Holland, , 1997 ; and consensus has begun to coalesce for two similar models of cognition
329
-the Cattell-Horn-Carroll (Carroll, 1993; McGrew, 2009) 
331
The aective domain, which seems to be the topic that many researchers have in mind when using the 332 term "personality, " has traditionally been referred to as "temperament" (Clark and Watson, 2008; 333 Heineman, 1995) . Use of the term personality is once again problematic in this context for the same 
339
It is also necessary to acknowledge the confusion introduced by developmental researchers (Thomas 340 and Chess, 1977) seeking to distinguish adult "personality" from stable aective patterns in 341 pre-adolescent children, especially infants and toddlers (Heineman, 1995; Shiner and DeYoung, 2013) .
342
This point precipitates consideration of several fundamental issues, including the degree to which 343 temperamental dierences are dispositional, hereditary (as opposed to environmental), "biological, " and 344 stable. These issues will not be reviewed extensively here except to state that temperamental dierences 345 are operationally viewed as relatively stable traits which have been found to be associated with various 346 individual dierences in neurobiological processes on both the molecular genetic (Krueger and Johnson, 347 2008; and more broadly neuroanatomical levels (Canli et al., 2001; Canli, 2008) .
348
Further evidence supports the implication suggested by these biological associations -temperamental 349 dierences are innate and, depending on the trait, variability described by genetic and non-shared 350 environmental factors is roughly the same (Clark and Watson, 2008) . These data suggest that robust 351 models of temperament should account for empirical claims that various dierences are more or less evident across the lifespan. Indeed, it has been posited that the Big Five traits (and perhaps one 353 additional trait to account for "Activity Level") are well-suited for explaining temperament in infants 354 and children (Shiner and DeYoung, 2013) . In any case, the rationale for using the term "temperament" to 355 describe aective dierences in infants and children but not adults is not clear.
356
The cognitive and conative disciplines have traditionally been distinguished from temperament though, 357 strictly speaking, both of these are inuenced by aective variance. Research on individual dierences 358 in cognition has been a cornerstone of psychological research for well over 100 years (Lubinski, 2004), 359 and also the most frequent source of controversy (Gould, 2006; Herrnstein and Murray, 1994 (Holland, 1959 (Holland, , 1997 , organizes both interests and jobs according to six categories (and related scales) -
372
Realistic, Investigative, Artistic, Social, Enterprising, and Conventional. The framework itself allows for 373 hierarchical organization of specic occupations which can be grouped according to shared "basic 374 interest" categories and these in turn can be grouped at a higher level of six general interest factors 375 (Armstrong et al., 2004) . In other words, the basic interests may be seen as equivalent to the facet level 376 of the Big Five in the aective domain. It has also been suggested that the six factor structure can be 377 further simplied to two dimensions which are known as "data/ideas" and "people/things" (Armstrong 378 et al., 2008b; Prediger, 1982) .
379
It should be noted that the assessment of vocational interests as a proxy for conation is practical but words, the use of interests to capture conative dierences is problematic because (1) interest in a 385 behavior or activity is often dependent on knowledge about that activity and (2) interest does not reect 386 the intensity with which an activity is pursued, the enjoyment derived from it, or the circumstantial 387 factors which may impede or demand the pursuit of any given activity (e.g., socioeconomic status, 388 cultural inuences, etc.). Related to these issues is the fact that the various aspects of conation are 389 seemingly quite distinct: the assessment of interests provides a means of describing one's preferences; 390 motivation is generally framed as a measure of intensity (Carver and White, 1994; Gray and The stability of these aspects of conation has also received relatively little treatment. The Dynamics of 395 Action model (Atkinson and Birch, 1970) has been proposed for describing state-like variations, including daily and even momentary uctuations, which directly inuence temporal changes in activity 397 and action tendencies. More recently, this model has been re-parameterized in terms of cues, tendencies 398 and actions (Revelle, 1986; Revelle et al., 2010a) and its ecacy has been simulated for social 399 interactions (Fua et al., 2009 (Fua et al., , 2010 in an attempt to evaluate even broader models of approach and 400 avoidance motivation, such as Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (Corr and McNaughton, 2008; Gray 401 and McNaughton, 2000) and control theory (Carver and Scheier, 1982) . [I]t is generally admitted that all mental activity has these three aspects, cognitive, conative, and aective; and when we apply one of these adjectives to any phase of mental process, we mean merely that the aspect named is the most prominent of the three at that moment. Each cycle of activity has this triple aspect; though each tends to pass through these phases in which cognition, conation, and aection are in turn most prominent; as when the naturalist, catching sight of a specimen, recognizes it, captures it, and gloats over its capture.
William McDougall (1923) "
Prior work towards integration 404
Unfortunately, the emergence of cognitive, conative, and aective paradigms has occurred without 405 much regard for the degree to which these frameworks overlap or may be incompatible; these issues are 
411
Inuential studies involving temperament and interests have typically involved joint administration of 412 the NEO-PI-R ® (Costa and McCrae, 1992) and measures grounded in the RIASEC framework (the 413 Vocational Preference Inventory and the Self-Directed Search ® ) (Barrick et al., 2003; Costa et al., 1984; 414 Feist, 2012; Gottfredson et al., 1993; McKay and Tokar, 2012) , though one recent study did explore the 415 relations between lower-order facets and the RIASEC scales (Armstrong and Anthoney, 2009 ). The basic 416 ndings of this research, to the extent that it is consistent, suggests that signicant correlations between 417 the Big Five and RIASEC scales tend to be low and that it is therefore not appropriate to substitute the 418 two measures for one another (Costa et al., 1984; Gottfredson et al., 1993) . More recent results suggest 419 that appreciably higher correlations can be found when using more narrow personality measures for administration, scoring, and interpretation by a licensed practitioner (Camara et al., 2000) .
489
Prior research in the aective, cognitive, and conative domains has required dramatically dierent relationships between constructs and evaluating the t of models with many parameters (Kenny, 2012) .
495
These concerns are exacerbated when attempting to detect more complex relationships between 496 multiple, lengthy measures because participants of this type are rarely willing to participate in studies 497 lasting more than a couple of hours. In essence, the qualities of the clinical method (extensive testing of 498 a few participants costing considerable time and money) and the traditional research method (more 499 participants at little cost but relatively few measures) are both lacking when it comes to eective 500 cross-domain assessment.
501
It seems that, beneath the over-arching diculty of data collection across multiple domains in 502 dierential psychology, there exist three underlying challenges. The rst of these relates to the need for 503 samples which are large and relatively "representative" of the broader population (or at least the 504 population of interest). Second, the use of large samples precipitates the need for measures which can 505 be administered for little or no cost. The last challenge relates to the need to administer a large number 506 of variables across the sample in order to evaluate the structure across domains. Fortunately, innovative 507 solutions for addressing each of these challenges have been developed over the last two decades, as 508 briey described in the following sections.
Telemetric assessment
510
The number and variety of techniques for collecting data from large samples has increased dramatically 511 since the beginning of the "internet-era, " largely because it has become increasingly easy to reach 512 participants outside of the research laboratory (Wilt et al., 2011) . Web-based methods have 513 demonstrated improved sample characteristics in terms of both size and breadth with little loss of 514 validity (Fraley, 2004; Gosling et al., 2004; Skitka and Sargis, 2006) . Many large-scale, research-driven 515 internet surveys now exist and several of these have collected samples of unprecedented size -516 hundreds of thousands of participants or more (Condon and Revelle, 2014; Gosling et al., 2004; Kosinski 517 et al., 2013; Peterson et al., 2005; Revelle et al., 2010b; Sandy et al., 2013; Soto et al., 2010; Wang et al., 518 2012). With few exceptions (Condon and Revelle, 2014; Kosinski et al., 2013; Revelle et al., 2010b) , the 519 data collected from these samples has been limited to short questionnaires which assess constructs from 520 only a singular domain. Most of these also make use of traditional website frameworks, though it has 521 become increasingly common to collect data from mobile devices (Wilt et al., 2011) . These include both 522 older technologies such personal data assistants and SMS-enabled phones as well as more modern 523 devices such as smartphones and tablet computers. Concomitant with the need to collect data from large samples, it has been increasingly necessary to 532 utilize measures which are not burdened by the costs which are typically associated with using 533 copyright-restricted scales. In conjunction with his proposal for more rapid advancement in personality,
534
Goldberg (Goldberg, 1999) introduced a large pool of personality items for use in the public domain and 535 which were designed to accommodate assessment needs across a broad range of constructs. Historical 536 dependence on copyright-protected measures, as Goldberg has argued (Goldberg, 1999; Grucza and The International Personality Item Pool ("IPIP") now contains more than 2,500 items and has come to be 544 used widely within personality research (Goldberg, 2014) . These items, when supplemented by an 545 additional 1600 items from various sources (mainly from shorter scales of more narrow focus), form a 546 database of more than 4000 temperament items in total. This database does not include scales designed 547 to assess the cognitive and conative domains (at least, not to the extent that these are distinct from the 548 aective). Public-domain scales of Interests have only recently been developed; they include the Oregon 549 Vocational (Pozzebon et al., 2010) and Avocational Interest Scales and O*NET Interest Proler (Armstrong et al., 2008a; Rounds et al., 2010) which together number approximately 500 items.
551
Public-domain items for cognitive ability have not previously been available, in part because this type of 552 assessment is considerably dierent from items which ask participants about their typical behavior or 553 attitudes. Cognitive ability measures, by contrast, attempt to assess the level at which an individual 554 "maximally" performs (Condon and Revelle, 2014) . In these cases, items are not only copyrighted for 555 their commercial value but also for the sake of test security. As such, eorts to develop and validate 556 public-domain items have recently been pursued by the present author and colleagues (Condon and 557 Revelle, 2014; Revelle et al., 2010b; ICAR, 2014) . The challenge to item development lies in the fact that 558 the items are to remain in the public-domain while still maintaining adequate validity. This is 559 accomplished with modern item-generation techniques (Arendasy et al., 2006; Dennis et al., 2002 ) that 560 make use of algorithms which dictate the parameters of new items with predictable diculty and in 561 many alternate forms. These techniques allow for the creation of item types where the universe of 562 possible items is very large. This, in turn, reduces the threat to validity that arises from item disclosure.
563
These techniques can even be used to enhance test validity under administration paradigms that expose 564 participants to sample items prior to testing and use alternate forms during assessment as this 565 methodology reduces the eects of dierential test familiarity across participants.
566
The rst validation (Revelle et al., 2010b ) of these eorts was based on the administration of a 567 preliminary set of 56 items to more than 65,000 participants. These procedures (as well as description 568 and validation of more recently created item types) have since been rened (Condon and Revelle, 2014) mental and social health (Cella et al., 2007) , and the Personality Inventory for DSM-5 (the PID-5), which 582 has been designed to assess the rst empirically based model of maladaptive personality traits (Krueger 583 and Markon, 2014). When considered together, this growing pool of resources provide a pool of freely 584 available items of unprecedented breadth for individual dierences assessment. While telemetric assessment techniques have meaningfully improved the ability to collect larger and 587 more diverse samples, they have not generally been applied to collect data across wider sets of 588 individual dierences variables. In other words, they have been used to increase sample sizes (n) but not 589 to increase the number of variables administered (i). This is because they do not inherently provide a 590 means of assessing participants on a large pool of items without over-burdening individual participants.
Synthetic aperture personality assessment represents a variation on the standard method of web-based 592 assessment and is perhaps best explained by analogy to the technique on which it is based in radio and 593 optical astronomy. An historically problematic issue in these elds stemmed from the fact that the 594 resolution of a telescope is limited by its diameter. This resolution can be functionally increased by 595 combining input from multiple, linked sites into one coherent image. Eectively, a very large telescope 596 is created by synthesizing the input from many smaller ones. A prototypical example of this in radio 597 astronomy is the Very Large Array in Socorro, New Mexico where 27 relatively small (25 meter) radio 598 telescopes are spread out in a Y-shaped conguration to simulate the resolution of a 36 km telescope. In 599 optical astronomy, similar techniques are used in inferometry at the Keck Observatory in Hawaii.
600
Analogous techniques are available for data collection over the internet. Rather than combining signals 601 from the same source using dierent telescopes as is done in astronomy, the structure of personality can 602 be studied by combining the responses of many people across more items than any one person is willing 603 to answer. Instead of observing celestial objects beyond the visible range, psychologists can observe the 604 relations between personality constructs which would not otherwise be visible given practical 605 assessment constraints. This can be done by sweeping the assessment "telescope" across a wide range of 606 constructs or by focusing for short periods of time on high-priority topics.
607
This procedure is not without precedent. Lord (1955) has previously described theoretical procedures for It is not accurate to say that this sample is necessarily representative of any population other than those 629 individuals who want to take internet-based personality surveys, but it is more demographically diverse 
635
Additional categories of data collection include educational and occupational outcomes, parental 636 education and employment information, marital status, height, weight, health data (smoking, exercising, 637 sleep patterns), and self-reported achievement test scores. As may be evident based on the 638 methodological techniques described, these procedures have been rened after several years of online 639 data collection. In total, data have been collected from more than 300,000 participants to date. [W]e like to think of breakthrough ideas as sudden accelerations on the timeline, where a genius jumps ahead fty years and invents something that normal minds, trapped in the present moment, couldn't possibly have come up with. But the truth is that technological (and scientic) advances rarely break out of the adjacent possible; the history of cultural progress is, almost without exception, a story of one door leading to another door, exploring the palace one room at a time.
Steven Johnson (2010a) "
If the primary challenge to the development of a testable and integrated model of individual dierences 643 is methodology, paradigm adoption in dierential psychology may be a matter of evolving consensus on 644 the heels of incremental technological improvements rather than theoretical "revolution" (to use Kuhn's 645 terminology). The SAPA Project represents technological improvement in data collection in that it is 646 well-suited to evaluation of the structure of the multidimensional space that is described by the many 647 public-domain items that have been (or are currently being) developed across the aective, cognitive 648 and conative domains. This structure can then be used to inform the development of an empirically 649 integrated framework.
650
The rst several steps in this process involve the identication or reication of structural models in each 651 domain which oer the right balance of theoretical breadth and parsimony across a range of predicted 652 outcomes. For the aective domain, as described in Chapter 2, this work draws heavily on prior research 653 rooted in the psycholexical tradition. In the case of cognition, the identication of structural models is 654 somewhat biased by the (limited) availability of public-domain items, though preliminary evidence that 655 appears consistent with modern models is reviewed in Chapter 3. In the conative domain, research 656 which integrates data collected using competing vocational interest scales is described in Chapter 4.
657
The last chapter addresses the nal step of integration. Given the desire to develop predictive models
658
(which can later be tested by other researchers), integration will be focused on the construction of scales 659 that predict a wide range of specic "real-world" behaviors. The construction of these scales will rely 660 upon psychometric techniques (cluster analysis, factor analysis and two-parameter item-response 661 theory) that will facilitate the use of ecient administration protocols (e.g., computer-adaptive testing) 662 for these scales. The rationale for this approach -the creation of a collection of brief predictive 663 measures which are based on the integration of frameworks from the aective, cognitive, and conative domains -is rooted in the belief that dierential psychology is ready to begin an era of 665 empirically-testable paradigms that is no longer bound by compartmentalized, domain-specic research.
